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Interpretation Catalysts in Cyberspace
Rebecca Ingber*
Introduction
The cybersphere offers a rich space from which to explore the
development of international law in a compressed time frame. Rapidly
advancing capabilities and novel events distill and sharpen longstanding
debates in international law: questions involving how the law adapts to new
technologies; disagreement over the extent to which secret action can move
custom;1 disputes over the need for heightened transparency;2 and power
wrangling between states and soft law endeavors in driving the development
of the law. In particular, the continuously evolving need to determine how
existing laws apply to shifting capabilities provides fertile ground for
innovative legal positioning and interpretation. That constant innovation in
turn creates opportunities for discrete triggers for legal interpretation—or
“interpretation catalysts” as I have termed them elsewhere3—to influence the
path that legal evolution takes. Interpretation catalysts not only compel a
decision-making body to take a position on its interpretation of a legal rule;
they shape all aspects of the decision-making process, ultimately influencing
the legal position that body takes, and often the resulting law itself.4
In this generative space of cyber law, the Tallinn Manual processes of
the past ten years provide a valuable lens through which to witness the effects
of interpretation catalysts on the evolution of international law. The Tallinn
processes have been remarkable achievements, both in producing manuals
that navigate the web of international laws regulating state action in
cyberspace, and in driving states to consider and to continue to develop the

* Associate Professor, Boston University School of Law. Many thanks to Susan Akram, Pamela
Bookman, Daniela Caruso, Ashley Deeks, Kristen Eichensehr, Dustin Lewis, Dinah PoKempner,
Naz Modirzadeh, Robert Sloane, and Phil Spector for invaluable conversations and comments on
drafts. I am grateful to Stew Sibert for excellent research assistance.
1. Alexandra H. Perina, Black Holes and Open Secrets: The Impact of Covert Action on
International Law, 53 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 507, 511 (2015).
2. Harold H. Koh, The Legal Adviser’s Duty to Explain, 41 YALE J. INT’L L. 189, 189–90 (2016).
3. See Rebecca Ingber, Interpretation Catalysts and Executive Branch Legal Decisionmaking,
38 YALE J. INT’L L. 359, 360 (2013) (identifying the concept of “interpretation catalysts,” and
demonstrating their role in triggering distinct processes within the executive branch for formulating
legal positions).
4. Id. at 377.
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rules governing this space. The two Tallinn Manuals5 lay out for states not
only an experts’ sense of where consensus on the law currently stands, but
also—and just as importantly—the parameters of precisely where the
disagreements among states may lie, where there might be room for
movement, and what the outer parameters of that movement might be. And
for academics, the Tallinn processes also provide a unique case study to
consider the development of international law over a short period of time and
the influence of soft law processes on that development.
In particular, the Tallinn Manual processes and resulting manuals
provide insight into how these “interpretation catalysts,” or discrete triggers
for legal interpretation, influence the path that legal evolution takes.6 The
operative interpretation catalyst triggering the need for a legal decision
influences every aspect of decision making from the identity of the particular
players involved in an interpretative endeavor to the task before them, the
context in which they operate, and the investment in the project by the
relevant players.7 In the Tallinn processes, those players have included not
only the experts around the drafting table but also states watching and
engaging from the sidelines. All of these factors shape where the law—or
the interpretation of the law—ultimately lands.8
In prior work, I have explored the phenomenon of “interpretation
catalysts” through the lens of state decision making, specifically U.S.
executive branch legal decision making on matters of national security.9 In
that context, the lack of external checks on the U.S. President often means
that the executive branch legal position is virtually the only operative legal
constraint.10 The interpretation catalyst driving such executive branch
decision making therefore has an enormous influence not just on one party’s
opening legal position but on the governing law itself.11
In the case of the Tallinn processes, as I will elaborate in Part II,
interpretation catalysts operate on two levels. The initial interpretation
catalyst, the Estonia cyberattacks, impelled states to consider the applicable
legal framework to apply to those attacks. Most significantly for our

5. TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE
(Michael Schmitt ed., 2013) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL]; TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS (Michael Schmitt & Liis Vihul eds.,
2017) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL 2.0].
6. Ingber, supra note 3, at 377 (identifying and exploring the role of “interpretation catalysts”
in driving decision making in the context of U.S. executive branch legal interpretation).
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. Id.
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purposes, those events triggered the initiation and development of the first
Tallinn Manual process itself, thus setting those wheels in motion.12 Second,
both Tallinn processes have themselves acted and continued to act as
interpretation catalysts for states, compelling them—often intentionally—to
develop their positions on the legal rules governing cyberspace. As I will
touch on below as well, this case study illustrates not only how distinct events
can trigger and shape the path of legal interpretation, but also that these
triggers are not fixed; the power inherent in interpretation catalysts suggests
that they may also be manipulated to push the law toward desired ends.
Now, I should acknowledge up front that the stated intent of the
Manual’s drafters is not to drive the law but rather to lay out the current areas
of legal consensus and of continued debate.13 And yet the drafters also evince
a clear intent to push states “proactively” toward development of the law
themselves as well as in conjunction with the project.14 A state legal adviser
could not fail to notice that if states do not start working together to hammer
out the rules governing this space, there is a risk these non-state-driven
projects will continue to outpace them and ultimately may nudge the law in
directions that states do not necessarily wish it to go.15 It is for that very
reason that the Dutch government sponsored “The Hague Process,” a major
convening of states, in order to review and comment on the Tallinn Manual
2.0 while that process was underway.16
As states participating in The Hague Process no doubt concluded, it
would be naïve to assume that the Tallinn processes would have no effect on
development of the law. It is worth, then, pausing to consider the direction

12. See infra notes 45–48 and accompanying text.
13. Michael Schmitt, Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law of Cyber Operations: What
It Is and Isn’t, JUST SECURITY (Feb. 9, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/37559/tallinn-manual2-0-international-law-cyber-operations [https://perma.cc/Z7ZA-QXKN].
14. See id. (explaining the virtues of clarity in the law regulating state action, in, inter alia,
“lend[ing] stability to international relations” and “help[ing] deter other states from exploiting . . .
grey zones in the law of cyberspace”); Tallinn Manual Experts Meet for Intense Drafting Session,
NATO COOP. CYBER DEF. CTR. EXCELLENCE, 2:55–3:20 (Oct. 9, 2015), https://ccdcoe.org/tallinnmanual-20-be-completed-2016.html
[https://perma.cc/EY2S-MKTD]
(interviewing
Tim
McCormack, Professor of Law at the University of Melbourne, who explains that states are often
“reactive to new . . . developments” and that Tallinn 2.0 is an effort “to gather a group of experts
together to proactively clarify the state of the law in an area that states are still asking questions
about what law is going to apply”).
15. See Schmitt, supra note 13 (noting that participants in the Tallinn process intended “that it
would enhance the process of norm identification and elucidation by states”); Michael J. Adams, A
Warning About Tallinn 2.0 . . . Whatever It Says, LAWFARE (Jan. 4, 2017),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/warning-about-tallinn-20-. . .-whatever-it-says
[https://perma.cc/
92R7-RAM9] (expressing concern that users of the Tallinn manuals may inappropriately conclude
that the law in certain areas is more settled than states have in fact themselves determined).
16. See Schmitt, supra note 13 (describing “The Hague Process”).
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that such a project might push the law and indeed quite likely already has. I
do not take a strong normative position in this piece on the specific direction
cyber law has taken during the course of this project, other than to recognize
the benefits of clarity in the law for state actors and others interested in the
rule of law and in public law more generally. My intended contribution here
is primarily to highlight the strong influence of the triggers for legal
interpretation on decision-making processes, on the legal positions coming
out of those processes, and thus, on the ultimate development of the law. The
Tallinn processes—and specifically the second Tallinn process’s treatment
of international human rights law as contrasted with its treatment of the law
of armed conflict—form an invaluable case study to examine the role of
interpretation catalysts in legal interpretation.
I.

Human Rights in Cyber Law
Both of the Tallinn processes and their ultimate products—the original
Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare,17
released in 2013, and the Tallinn Manual 2.0, released this spring—are
enormous undertakings and incredible achievements. The convener’s intent
for each, we are told in the Tallinn 2.0 document itself, was to produce a
handbook that would provide an “objective restatement of the lex lata” to
actual practitioners, primarily “state legal advisers charged with providing
international law advice to governmental decision makers, both civilian and
military.”18
I have no doubt that these state actors will indeed find the Tallinn
Manual 2.0 a useful resource. And it will be most useful to these state legal
advisers and other practitioners not because, as some might assume, it
provides flexible, expansive interpretations of the legal rules, which will lend
them legal justification for whichever actions they wish to take in cyberspace;
rather, it will be useful primarily to the extent it provides them with granular,
specific answers regarding their legal obligations and constraints in areas
where practitioners may seek clear guidance as to the appropriate legal space
in which to operate.
Furthermore, Tallinn 2.0 does not shy away from areas that might be
most controversial for states, such as the role of international human rights
law in constraining states’ actions in cyberspace. In fact, it tackles this matter

17. See generally TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 5.
18. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 5, at 2–3; see also Rachel Ansley, Tallinn Manual 2.0:
Defending Cyberspace, ATLANTIC COUNCIL (Feb. 15, 2017), http://www.atlanticcouncil
.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/tallinn-manual-2-0-defending-cyberspace
[https://perma.cc/UKC73YXG] (quoting Michael Schmitt: “We were not writing for academics. We were writing for
countries.”).
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head-on and announces explicitly that “[i]nternational human rights law is
applicable to cyber-related activities.”19 Despite the difficulty in finding
consensus among the experts—not to mention the state participants in the
process—in determining precisely how specific rules of human rights law
operate in cyberspace and the disparity among states in acceptance of
particular treaty regimes, the Manual firmly states that these rules act as
constraints on states.20 The Manual suggests no intent to evade human rights
rules; quite the contrary, it suggests (and this is a stated goal of its leadership)
an intent to place a marker for future actors to understand that human rights
law provides constraints and to prompt them to determine precisely how
these rules operate in context.21
And yet, despite this clear, human rights-embracing statement and
intent, I predict the Manual will face some real criticism from the human
rights community, and for good reason.22 The human rights chapter is
everything the handbook-style rules regulating state action under the use of
force and law of armed conflict (LOAC) sections are not; the legal rules
described in the human rights chapter are painted with broad brushstrokes, at
a high level of generality, and thus, as I explain below, suggest greater
flexibility for state discretion and potentially even evasion. Ultimately, the
international human rights law (IHRL) rules laid out by the Manual simply
provide insufficient clarity to be terribly useful to state legal advisers.
In a vacuum, there may be little danger in a document that simply
restates a human rights obligation at a high level of generality. Here, the
danger lies largely in the disparity between the human rights chapter and
other critical sections of the Manual, in particular the significant discussions

19. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 5, at 182 (Rule 34). This statement is consistent with
United Nations General Assembly’s (UNGA) approach of the last several years. See, e.g., G.A.
Res. 68/167, ¶ 3 (Dec. 18, 2013) (“[T]he same rights that people have offline must also be protected
online, including the right to privacy.”).
20. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 5, at 182 (Rule 34).
21. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 5, at 182 (imposing obligation on states to conform
to international human rights law in cyberspace despite recognizing that “state understandings
concerning the precise scope of certain human rights entitlements in the cyber context . . . vary”);
Michael Schmitt, Dir., Tallinn Manual 2.0 Project, Address at the Texas Law Review Symposium:
Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations (Feb. 7, 2017). In
interviews and writings, Tallinn’s director, Michael Schmitt, has explained that the goal of the
Manual more broadly is to help “states focus their efforts where clarification of the law is needed
and in their national interest.” E.g., Schmitt, supra note 13.
22. The Manual is only weeks old, but at least one commentator has raised concerns with its
treatment of human rights. See Dinah PoKempner, Gen. Counsel, Human Rights Watch, Address
at the Texas Law Review Symposium: Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to
Cyber Operations (Feb. 7, 2017); Dinah PoKempner, Squinting Through the Pinhole: A Dim View
of Human Rights from Tallinn 2.0, 95 TEXAS L. REV. 1599, 1602 (2017); see also Adams, supra
note 15.
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of the law governing the use of force and LOAC. The Manual holds itself
out as providing the very clarity and granularity that is missing from the
discussion of human rights. And experience suggests that the absence of that
specificity may read to states as space or flexibility in the law.
I should include here some caveats. My observations—including that
this particular Manual is predominantly engaged with the law governing the
use of force and LOAC on a level of detail that it does not employ with
respect to IHRL—are not intended as criticism of the actors involved here or
even of the main approach of the Manual. I see two potential reasons for the
disparity the Manual takes to these two bodies of law: One is actual
ambiguity or lack of detail in IHRL and its relationship to cyberspace vis-àvis LOAC.23 Another is that the actors involved or the process itself led
toward a disparate treatment of these two sections. There may be a bit of
each at work here. But these may not be entirely separable factors.
Considering the years-long first Tallinn process’s focus on the rules of cyber
warfare, we cannot entirely divorce any paucity in the law of human rights
in cyberspace from the process’s outsized focus on drilling into the laws of
war. It may well be that the provenance of the Tallinn process gave the laws
of war a head start.24 In any event, as will be clear in my discussion of
interpretation catalysts below, I see this disparity as an organic and
potentially inevitable development given the original triggers for the project
and the path its development has taken. At the end of this section, I will make
a modest suggestion for how to address the concerns I raise here. But for
now, let us dive into those specific concerns.
First, in order to understand how both state actors and human rights
advocates might approach this manual, it is worth understanding some
context regarding the relationship of states—in particular the United States—
to international human rights law in the realm of conflict and national
security. For years, U.S. human rights advocates, in particular, have sought
to gain traction with the government on a broad range of matters dealing with
conflict and security.25 And yet there remains a perception—particularly

23. See, e.g., Marko Milanovic, Foreign Surveillance and Human Rights, Part 5: The Substance
of an Extraterritorial Right to Privacy, EJIL: TALK! (Nov. 29, 2013), https://www.ejiltalk
.org/foreign-surveillance-and-human-rights-part-5-the-substance-of-an-extraterritorial-right-toprivacy/ [https://perma.cc/6WXQ-XTP2] (discussing the need to “flesh[] out” detailed rules
governing an “extraterritorial right to privacy”).
24. See id. (noting that detailing such rules “will happen in an iterative process”).
25. As part of this effort, U.S. human rights organizations have over the course of the last
decade and a half created divisions within their institutions specifically devoted to matters of war
and national security. See, e.g., About the ACLU’s National Security Project, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES
UNION, https://www.aclu.org/other/about-aclus-national-security-project [https://perma.cc/27CF4E4U] (detailing the ACLU’s “National Security Project,” which was “[o]riginally created as an
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with respect to the U.S. government—that the law of international human
rights has been sidelined in favor of a LOAC framework, LOAC expertise,
and even LOAC-derived rules in contexts in which states have struggled to
adapt international legal frameworks to new contexts. For example, through
three very different presidential administrations, the U.S. government has
applied the laws of war to its detention, targeting, and even surveillance
operations in the conflict with al Qaeda and other groups.26 Even when the
government has found those rules difficult to map perfectly onto a conflict
with a non-state actor, the government has retained a LOAC framework and
reasoned by analogy to that body of law in determining the lawful space in
which it could operate.27
Human rights experts, in the meantime, have repeatedly sought to push
the government to accept and apply international human rights norms in this

informal working group after the September 2001 attacks”); see also Counterterrorism, HUM. RTS.
FIRST, http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/topics/counterterrorism [https://perma.cc/NA27-KAA4]
(highlighting Human Rights First’s work at the nexus of national security and human rights);
National Security, HUM. RTS. WATCH, https://www.hrw.org/united-states/national-security
[https://perma.cc/F9C4-3Z8G]; National Security and Human Rights Campaign, OPEN SOC’Y
FOUND. (Sept. 18, 2013), https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/grants/national-security-andhuman-rights-campaign [https://perma.cc/7VGC-7PYJ]; Security and Human Rights, AMNESTY
INT’L, http://www.amnestyusa.org/our-work/issues/security-and-human-rights [https://perma.cc/
X6N5-G47P] (detailing the work of Amnesty International’s U.S.-based affiliate with respect to
national security and human rights); U.S. National Security and Human Rights, OPEN SOC’Y POL’Y
CTR. (Feb. 24, 2017), https://opensocietypolicycenter.org/issues/u-s-national-security-humanrights/ [https://perma.cc/ZN6U-XF5P]
26. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 516 (2004); Respondents’ Memorandum Regarding the
Government’s Detention Authority Relative to the Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay at 1, In re
Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation, 577 F. Supp. 2d 312 (D.D.C. 2008) (No. 08-442) [hereinafter
March 13 Brief]; Rebecca Ingber, Co-Belligerency, 42 YALE J. INT’L L. 67, 74–80 (2017). While
we do not yet have a definitive statement from the Trump Administration on its legal position on
the framework for these conflicts with al Qaeda and other groups, all evidence suggests at a
minimum that the Administration intends to continue a wartime framework. See, e.g., Charlie
Savage, ISIS Detainees May Be Held at Guantánamo, Document Shows, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/08/us/politics/guantanamo-islamic-state-detainees.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/FBU9-55VW] (discussing a leaked draft executive order announcing the Trump
Administration’s potential policy of military detention for members of al Qaeda, ISIS, and other
groups); Draft Executive Order on Protecting America Through Lawful Detention of Terrorists and
Other
Designated
Enemy
Elements
(2017),
https://assets.documentcloud.org/
documents/3455640/Revised-draft-Trump-EO-on-detainees-and-Gitmo.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
K23D-DXFA] (characterizing, within a leaked draft of a Trump Administration Executive Order
obtained by the New York Times, conflicts with Al Qaeda and other groups as a “continuing state of
armed conflict with terrorist groups”).
27. See March 13 Brief, supra note 26, at 1 (“Principles derived from law-of-war rules
governing international armed conflicts, therefore, must inform the interpretation of the detention
authority Congress has authorized for the current armed conflict.”).

1538

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 95:1531

space and to bring U.S. policies in line with these rules.28 Throughout the
course of the Obama Administration, those efforts of human rights advocates,
and the resulting tension with and within the Administration, in addition to
pressure from allies, is part of what lay beneath Obama-era attempts to
impose an additional layer of often human rights-derived policy prescriptions
on top of the Administration’s interpretation of its legal constraints on U.S.
actions in a range of areas, such as the targeted killing realm. 29 In many of
these areas, however, the Obama Administration did not alter those
underlying legal positions, which were largely a holdover from the prior
Administration’s decision to treat the conflict in LOAC terms.30 As a matter
of law, the Obama Administration also generally retained a variety of legal
tools—including the concept of “lex specialis” and the position that many
human rights treaties were not intended to apply extraterritorially, both of
which I will discuss in more detail below—that together entailed an evasion
of a strict application of specific human rights rules onto many of its activities
in this space.31 The result in certain areas was a human rights policy overlay

28. See, e.g., Alfred de Zayas, Human Rights and Indefinite Detention, 87 INT’L REV. RED
CROSS 15, 37 (2005) (rejecting “indefinite detention” as unlawful under international human rights
law).
29. Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, White House, Fact Sheet: U.S. Policy Standards
and Procedures for the Use of Force in Counterterrorism Operations Outside the United States and
Areas of Active Hostilities (May 23, 2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/05/23/fact-sheet-us-policy-standards-and-procedures-use-force-counterterrorism
[https://perma.cc/Z2BM-VA39] (explaining the policy overlay of procedural safeguards, as well as
near-certainty requirements and a preference for capture over kill, for targeting operations).
30. See Ashley S. Deeks, The Obama Administration, International Law, and Executive
Minimalism, 110 AM. J. INT’L L. 646, 646–47 (2016) (arguing that the expansion of power under
the Bush Administration enabled the Obama Administration to take a more minimalist approach
without sacrificing any of the legal powers gained in the Bush years); Rebecca Ingber, The Obama
War Powers Legacy and the Internal Forces that Entrench Executive Power, 110 AM. J. INT’L L.
680, 681–82 (2016) (arguing that internal features of the executive branch lead to the retention of
legal authorities by the President from one administration to the next).
31. See, e.g., WHITE HOUSE, REPORT ON THE LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORK GUIDING THE
UNITED STATES’ USE OF MILITARY FORCE AND RELATED NATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS 34
(2016),
https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/framework.Report_Final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R664-YKZE] (“In accordance with the doctrine of lex specialis, where these
bodies of law conflict, the law of armed conflict would take precedence as the controlling body of
law with regard to the conduct of hostilities and the protection of war victims. However, . . . armed
conflict does not automatically suspend [o]r . . . displace the application of all international human
rights obligations.”); Marko Milanovic, Harold Koh’s Legal Opinions on the US Position on the
Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties, EJIL: TALK! (Mar. 7, 2014),
http://www.ejiltalk.org/harold-kohs-legal-opinions-on-the-us-position-on-the-extraterritorialapplication-of-human-rights-treaties/ [https://perma.cc/YG99-NTUK] (discussing reports of leaked
opinions by then-State Department Legal Adviser Harold Koh advising the U.S. Government to
change its position on the extraterritorial application of its ICCPR and CAT obligations); Beth Van
Schaack, United States Report to the UN Human Rights Committee: Lex Specialis and
Extraterritoriality, JUST SECURITY (Oct. 16, 2013), https://www.justsecurity.org/1761/united-
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on top of a LOAC legal framework, an outcome Naz Modirzadeh has
criticized as blurring the lines between genuine legal rules and the policies
governing state action.32 This recent history is an important backdrop against
which to examine and understand the Tallinn Manual 2.0’s approach to
human rights in cyberspace.
The most immediate, and perhaps striking, thing one notes in reviewing
the IHRL chapter, particularly in light of the background that I just surveyed,
is that its overarching tone is quite friendly to the application of IHRL in
cyberspace. The very first rule states firmly and clearly that “[i]nternational
human rights law is applicable to cyber-related activities.”33 This written
statement accords with the stated intent of the directors of the project, who
have noted that their objective in this chapter was to alert state legal advisers
of the need to grapple with their state’s human rights obligations in this
realm.34 To the extent the simple alerting of legal advisers to the need to
address a body of law is the goal, the chapter itself accomplishes this, and
perhaps need not have even moved on from that initial rule.
But the chapters of this Manual cannot each be read in a vacuum; they
exist and will be read alongside the rest of the work as a whole. And when
one examines the Manual in its entirety, there is a stark contrast between the
approach taken in the human rights chapter and that of the other content of
the handbook, in particular the nearly 250 pages of direct discussion of
LOAC plus additional content threaded throughout the Manual. The
immediate impression, to say the least, is that human rights law was not the
focus of this project.
Now, the fact that a soft law project focuses on one area of law at the
expense of or in lieu of another is itself neither an error nor a flaw.
Nevertheless, to the extent the project is held out as an overarching manual
covering the waterfront on all issues involving cyberspace that may arise for
a state, it is important to highlight the contrasting approaches to these
different bodies of law and flag some potential hazards, particularly for states
looking to this Manual as the definitive work on the international law
governing cyberspace. In particular, and considering the backdrop I laid out
at the start of this section, there are some flags here that suggest state actors

states-lex-specialis-extraterritoriality/ [https://perma.cc/R84E-CM44] (laying out the recent history
of the U.S. position on lex specialis and extraterritoriality of its ICCPR obligations before the
Human Rights Committee).
32. Naz K. Modirzadeh, Folk International Law: 9/11 Lawyering and the Transformation of
the Law of Armed Conflict to Human Rights Policy and Human Rights Law to War Governance, 5
HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 225, 228–30 (2014).
33. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 5, at 182 (Rule 34).
34. Schmitt, supra note 13; see also Michael N. Schmitt & Liis Vihul, Respect for Sovereignty
in Cyberspace, 95 TEXAS L. REV. 1639, 1640–41 (2017).
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might rely upon the human rights chapter as a justification for discretion
rather than as a source of clear constraint. I will discuss a few of these here.
A.

Confinement of the Human Rights Chapter to a Narrowly Defined
Geographic Space in the Manual

One concern with the approach the Manual takes to human rights is
geographic—both in form and substance. Discussion of human rights in the
Manual is primarily confined to the human rights chapter—which is itself a
relatively short 30 pages in an over 600-page manual, of which about half is
devoted to the laws of war.
There are a number of alternative approaches the Manual drafters might
have taken to address the role of human rights law in this space. A more
human rights-focused approach might have been to weave human rights law
norms and rules throughout the discussion, in each of the sections, as
different scenarios are contemplated, as is done throughout with LOAC.35 It
is not clear to what extent human rights experts who drafted or reviewed the
human rights chapter were also involved in the work of the rest of the Manual
or to what extent they were able to weigh in on each and every rule
throughout. But a human rights-driven approach might have resulted in a
discussion of how human rights law regulates, for example, how a state may
engage civilians who participate in acts of hostilities during armed conflict;
or the concept of collective punishment; the rule about cyber booby traps;
contemplation of a state’s duty to protect cyber infrastructure; or cyber
interference with telecommunications; each of which could readily benefit
from a discussion of how human rights law also regulates state actions in
such circumstances.36
Instead, the Manual relegates the discussion to a chapter within a larger
section marked “specialised regimes,” alongside primarily geographicallyfocused legal regimes—like the seas, outer space, and diplomatic premises.37

35. See, e.g., TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 5, at 53 (discussing the interplay between
jurisdiction, LOAC, and Tallinn 2.0 Rule 8); id. at 74 (discussing how LOAC affects foreign state
immunities with respect to Tallinn 2.0 Rules 44, 82, and 152); id. at 127 (discussing the interaction
between countermeasures, LOAC, and Tallinn 2.0 Rules 23, 72, 92, and 113).
36. Id. at 217 (discussing the duty to protect cyber infrastructure under Rule 40); id. at 288
(discussing the duty to safeguard international telecommunication infrastructure under Rule 61); id.
at 294 (discussing harmful interference with non-military cyber services under Rule 63); id. at 428
(discussing civilian direct participants in hostilities under Rule 97); id. at 457 (discussing cyber
booby traps under Rule 106); id. at 539 (discussing collective punishment under Rule 106). This is
not to say the Tallinn Manual 2.0 is entirely devoid of human rights references outside of that
chapter; the Manual does include throughout some limited cross-referencing to the human rights
chapter, though nowhere near as extensively or fluidly as it interweaves the discussion of LOAC.
37. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 5, at vi–vii.

2017]

Interpretation Catalysts in Cyberspace

1541

Though this was not necessarily intended, a reasonable inference to draw
from that placement is that IHRL is a body of law parallel to those specialized
regimes. One might be forgiven for assuming that it only exists in some kind
of confined geographic space. Of course, the view that a state’s human rights
law obligations are entirely constrained by geography and inoperative
beyond that state’s legal borders does exist, and lies on one extreme side of
the debate over the extraterritorial application of human rights law. Notably,
it is a view that the Manual itself does not espouse.38 Nevertheless, the
confined geographic location in the Manual seems to reflect a residual sense
of human rights law as belonging to a wholly separate and confined space,
which belies the complexity of state positions on how they see and apply their
obligations outside their borders. And it might help entrench such an
impression for state legal advisers relying upon the Manual as a guide.
B.

Lex Specialis
Another flag for state actors is the Manual’s discussion of lex
specialis.39 The Manual states that the “precise interplay between [LOAC]
and [IHRL] remains unsettled,” but that under the concept of lex specialis,
the laws of war will often comprise the more specific rules to apply to armed
conflict.40 There is much packed into that brief statement, and it must be read
in light of the context I discussed above, in which—whether there is merit to
this approach or not—the concept of lex specialis has long been applied by
the states to assert formal compliance with human rights law, while evading
their specific application to wartime activities. In this case, by not laying out
precisely how this rule of lex specialis will apply in individual situations, the
Manual risks suggesting to states that they have significant discretion to
disregard human rights rules in armed conflict by pointing to “more specific”
LOAC rules. As I will discuss in the section that follows, the Manual itself
then lays out these LOAC rules in careful detail.
C.

Lack of Granularity in the Human Rights Rules
A concern that goes hand in hand with the problem of lex specialis is
the lack of granularity in the rules announced in the human rights chapter.

38. Id. at 183–87.
39. Id. at 181.
40. Id. The Manual cites for this concept the International Court of Justice Nuclear Weapons
advisory opinion, which states that while human rights obligations do not generally “cease in times
of war,” the interpretation of those obligations is “determined by the applicable lex specialis,
namely, the law applicable in armed conflict which is designed to regulate the conduct of
hostilities.” Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226
(July 8).
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As I mentioned, this chapter opens with an overarching statement that is quite
favorable to the role of human rights in regulating state action. Yet each of
the rules listed in the chapter is so high-level or vague as to be fairly anodyne
in its practical suggestion of constraints on state action.
Consider how the Manual might have treated differently even just the
substantive areas that it lists under Rule 35, “[i]ndividuals enjoy the same
international human rights with respect to cyber-related activities that they
otherwise enjoy.”41 Each of these distinct substantive areas, from freedom
of expression to privacy to due process, might itself be its own rule, or even
its own chapter. This is not for lack of an interest in granularity by the
Manual itself. Consider the Manual’s treatment of any LOAC rule as a
comparison. Compare this broad rule, “[i]ndividuals enjoy the same
international human rights with respect to cyber-related activities that they
otherwise enjoy,”42 with, for example, Rule 105 prohibiting indiscriminate
means or methods:
It is prohibited to employ means or methods of cyber warfare that are
indiscriminate by nature. Means or methods of cyber warfare are
indiscriminate by nature when they cannot be: (a) directed at a specific
military objective, or (b) limited in their effects as required by the law
of armed conflict and consequently are of a nature to strike military
objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction.43
Or Rule 132 on medical computers:
Computers, computer networks, and data that form an integral part of
the operations or administration of medical units and transports must
be respected and protected, and in particular may not be made the
object of attack.44
Or Rule 122 on perfidy:
In the conduct of hostilities involving cyber operations, it is prohibited
to kill or injure an adversary by resort to perfidy. Acts that invite the
confidence of an adversary to believe that he or she is entitled to, or is
obliged to accord, protection under the law of armed conflict, with
intent to betray that confidence, constitute perfidy.45
First, the broad human rights rule is phrased as a contingent standard: it
is a rule that depends entirely on a state’s view of its human rights obligations

41. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 5, at 187.
42. Id. Note that this statement itself was not particularly groundbreaking, considering states
have affirmed such a statement through United Nations General Assembly resolutions since 2013.
See, e.g., G.A. Res. 68/167, supra note 19.
43. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 5, at 455.
44. Id. at 515.
45. Id. at 491.
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in other spheres. The LOAC rules, by contrast, are stated as hard
prohibitions.
Moreover, the human rights rule operates at a very high level of
generality, whereas the LOAC rules are not only noncontingent, they are
highly specific. Particularly when viewed alongside such granular LOAC
rules, the high level of generality in the human rights chapter may suggest to
states that they have significant discretion in how to engage their human
rights obligations. For legal advisers who pick up the Manual to determine
what they need to tell their clients in a particular scenario, these rules may
not provide sufficient specificity to be of much use beyond a general notice
that there is another potential body of law operating in this realm.
Moreover, the juxtaposition in the Manual of highly detailed LOAC
rules against a vague, high-level discussion of human rights rules must be
considered in light of the lex specialis issue I discussed above. Considering
the Manual’s restatement of the lex specialis concept that the more specific
rule governs, the Manual’s severe disparity in its treatment of human rights
law in relation to LOAC rules could easily be read to suggest that the LOAC
rules are in fact more “specific” in each case, and thus that they crowd out
the IHRL rules, rather than an alternative possibility: that the Manual simply
did not drill down into—or compel states to develop through the course of
two Manual processes—each potential principle of human rights law as it
applies in the cyber context.
Rather than provide a bona fide handbook on the application of human
rights law to cyberspace, this chapter reads as more of a placeholder. The
intimation is: international human rights law is real, it is important, and it
regulates state action even in this realm . . . and good luck figuring out how
to apply it.
D.

Methodology
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, even the methodology of the
Manual itself appears constructed through the lens of use-of-force- and
LOAC-based systems of legal rules, and is thus inadvertently weighted
against deriving granular rules from human rights law. As the Manual
explains, the process for adopting rules involved a requirement of consensus
among the “International Group of Experts” that a rule reflected customary
international law.46 As such, the rules would be “binding on all states, subject
to the possible existence of an exception for persistent objectors.”47 At times,
a treaty text might itself “represent[] a reliable and accurate restatement of

46. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 5, at 4.
47. Id.
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customary international law,”48 according to the experts, in which case the
Manual’s rule will resemble the treaty text.
This approach makes sense in the LOAC context, where state
governments largely drive legal interpretation, and where there is a good deal
of customary international law, as well as near-universal adoption of many
significant treaties such that many are now taken to represent customary
international law.49 That widespread adoption of many treaty regimes and
the deep core of customary international law mean that a project to determine
the LOAC rules applicable to cyberspace can address a universal set of rules
applicable to virtually all states without undermining the entire project.
By contrast, the international human rights legal regime, as Dinah
PoKempner addresses in her piece, is heavily treaty-based, and elaborated
through a wide array of governmental, quasi-governmental, and even
nongovernmental mechanisms.50 A methodology that is geared toward
addressing only those rules that are universally applicable as customary
international law or through nearly universally ratified treaties will highly
underrepresent the plethora of treaty rules with which any given state is
obligated to comply. Likewise, a methodology based solely in rules
universally accepted by states misses the disparate array of enforcement
mechanisms states face, which play large and differing roles in expounding
human rights norms. The Manual makes a quick reference to part of this
dilemma in the introduction, stating that “[u]sers of this Manual are cautioned
that states may be subject to additional rules of international law set forth in
treaties to which they are Parties.”51 But the universal and state-driven

48. Id.
49. See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Victims of International Armed Conflicts,
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 4; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
and Relating to the Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609
(the United States is a signatory of both Additional Protocols but is currently one of very few states
which have not yet ratified either); see also Customary Law, INT’L COMMITTEE RED CROSS,
https://www.icrc.org/en/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/customary-law
[https://perma.cc/
26PV-2BTR]. For the long list of treaties applicable to wartime, see Treaties, States Parties and
Commentaries,
INT’L
COMMITTEE
RED
CROSS,
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl
[https://perma.cc/2U63-4J8H].
50. PoKempner, supra note 22, at 1602 (stating that “nongovernmental experts, practitioners,
and scholars have for decades provided much of the ‘gas’ in the ‘engine’ of human rights law
mechanisms, be they treaty bodies, courts, review conferences, U.N. or regional procedures, or
legislatures, and not only through the supply of relevant facts, but through legal analysis and
interpretation”).
51. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 5, at 4. Interestingly, the Manual does at times point to
specific treaty rules of LOAC as applicable to only those states that are party to the treaty. See, e.g.,
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approach of the Manual provides yet another reason for the disparity in
granular rules in the human rights section as compared to the rest of the
Manual.
***
To conclude this section, it is very possible that a simple highlighting of
human rights as another set of obligations states will need to address may
very well be what the Manual drafters intended, or all they felt they could
provide, when confronted with an area on which they could not reach
consensus, or where there is still much work to do to develop how to apply
the law in practice. And from the perspective of those who care about
protecting human rights—as I gather the Manual experts do—a manual that
exhorts its audience to consider human rights law is likely better than a
document that ignores it altogether, or much worse, states that this body of
law has no place in regulating cyber law. Nevertheless, the Manual’s
approach to human rights is a far cry from the truly detail-oriented,
practitioner-focused handbook that it serves as for other areas of law,
particularly for the laws governing the use of force and armed conflict. And
that disparity might leave operators with the impression that the rules of
international human rights law governing cyberspace truly are undefined and,
therefore, highly permissive.
All of this suggests that either human rights law simply was not the focus
of this project, or that the experts viewed the state of human rights law as not
as well-developed as the rules of LOAC as applied to the cyber realm (or
both). If the former, this could be addressed by simply clarifying this early
in the Manual itself—including front and center in the chapter addressing
human rights. Otherwise, the Manual risks leaving readers with the
impression that the latter—a lack of clarity in the law—is the cause for this
disparity.
And if that is the case, if the experts running this process simply found
that human rights law as applied to cyberspace was less well-developed than
the laws of LOAC, then one has to wonder if that is not itself at least in part
a function of the fact that the Tallinn project took one path from the start and
not another. Considering that this decade-long process has been, after all, a
project aimed at developing an understanding of where the law stands, and
simultaneously at pushing states to develop that law themselves,52 the experts

id. at 481 (stating under Rule 118, Choice of Targets, “[f]or States Parties to Additional Protocol I,
when a choice is possible between several military objectives for obtaining a similar military
advantage, the objective to be selected for cyberattack shall be that the attack on which may be
expected to cause the least danger to civilian lives and to civilian objects”).
52. See Schmitt, supra note 13 (“Those who participated in the seven-year Tallinn Manuals’
journey hoped only that it would enhance the process of norm identification and elucidation by
states.”).
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leading the first Tallinn Manual project on the laws of cyberwarfare could
rightfully consider themselves to have succeeded if that process in fact
compelled states to develop clarity on how LOAC applies in the cyber realm.
As the next section will elaborate, I see the Manual’s approach to the
human rights chapter as an organic and perhaps inevitable result of the initial
trigger for the project itself, which defined the process taken to reach this
ultimate result. If this result was driven by the process, the solution cannot
easily lie in simply editing or lengthening the chapter itself, or in drilling
down more concretely into the human rights rules within the context of the
same process. Perhaps the only real option for human rights scholars and
practitioners is to take up the task themselves, and draft a human rightsfocused manual through a human rights-driven process. For the Tallinn
Manual itself, however, it would be worth announcing a strong caveat to
explain that the methodology, expertise, and direction of the process were not
targeted toward the practice and mechanisms of the international human
rights legal system, and should not be understood to represent the whole of
lex lata in that space.
II.

Interpretation Catalysts and Cyber Law
So how did it come to pass that a manual intended to provide clarity for
states on rules regulating and constraining their action in cyberspace, may
inadvertently provide states with a heightened sense of discretionary
flexibility and potentially even—at the most cynical level—tools for evading
the application of those rules in the area of international human rights law?
To understand this, we need to consider the context in which the original
Tallinn process was born, sponsored, drafted, and ultimately published, and
then served as the backdrop against which the Tallinn 2.0 drafters operated.
As I note above, I have written elsewhere that the specific triggers for
states’ interpretations of the legal rules that bind them have a strong influence
on their ultimate legal positions. These “[i]nterpretation catalysts can drive
[states] to crystallize a legal view on a matter that is entirely novel; can bring
a formerly identified but dormant issue into urgent focus; and can transfer an
issue from one decision-making forum to another.”53 Interpretation catalysts
influence decision making not only by forcing states to articulate a legal
position, but in shaping the process through which states reach that decision,
“including by determining a particular question’s point of entry within the
government, framing the task, shaping the interpretive process, establishing
the relative influence of the relevant actors, and informing the contextual
pressures and interests that may bear on the decision.”54 For example, the

53. Ingber, supra note 3, at 360.
54. Id. at 360–61.
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state’s process for determining its legal position on the rules governing
treatment of military detainees might differ dramatically depending on
whether the state must first consider its public legal position within the
context of drafting briefs in defensive litigation, or instead, in preparation for
a hearing before a human rights treaty body.55 The actors around the
decision-making table; the process for reaching a decision; the identities of
the actors holding the pen in drafting the specific language as well as the
ultimate decider if consensus cannot be reached; the biases; contextual
pressures; and time frame against which the decision makers act—all of these
factors have a significant influence on the ultimate position the state takes.56
And all of these factors are driven and defined by the initial “interpretation
catalyst” for that decision.
In the case of the Tallinn processes, interpretation catalysts have
operated on two levels: first, in prompting the creation of and direction for a
group of experts seeking to define legal rules as guidance for state actors; and
second, in prompting states themselves to participate in and receive guidance
from that expert-led process. At the first level, the Estonia cyberattacks not
only triggered the initial decision to channel legal decision making into a
particular expert-led process; that initial catalyst also defined the creation of
the entire process and the context in which the body of experts originated and
defined their initial roles. In contrast to the influence of interpretation
catalysts on the decision-making processes of a preexisting body, such as a
state, the catalyst that triggered the Tallinn process could have an even more
powerful effect on the resulting decision-making process and positions,
because it could influence everything from the ground up, including the
constitution and mandate of this new entity.
At the second level, the Tallinn processes themselves have functioned
as interpretation catalysts, triggering states to engage in legal positioning in
response. The Tallinn processes have—and have intentionally—impelled
states to engage in a rule-definition process on the terms and timing of the
Tallinn expert-led groups. And those terms and timing included tackling a
first-stage, law-of-war-driven project, Tallinn 1.0, before taking on the
broader process of Tallinn 2.0.
A.

Interpretation Catalysts at Stage One

Given the significance I place on the initial catalyst for interpretation, a
critical—perhaps the most critical—publicly-known piece of this history is
the trigger for the Tallinn process itself: the cyberattacks on Estonia in 2007,

55. Id. at 390.
56. Id.

1548

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 95:1531

in which large portions of the country’s cyber infrastructure—specifically
government websites, banks, and Estonian news outlets—were essentially
shut down for about three weeks as a result of massive distributed denial of
service attacks.57 These events raised a broad range of legal questions, many
domestic, such as how Estonia’s penal laws applied to actions in cyberspace,
and its rules governing surveillance.
But on the international plane, the governments of Estonia and other
states were concerned primarily about questions of state attribution, the range
of lawful responses available, and what activities could be or even must be
taken by Estonia’s international allies, including whether Estonia might
invoke NATO’s Article 5 provisions regarding collective self-defense.58
Estonia in particular had an incentive to conceive of those events in war
terms, considering NATO’s mutual defense obligations. For that reason or
others, there was a felt need among affected states to understand the legal
parameters for how international law rules governing conflict apply in the
cyber context, and a pressing need, driven partly by state interest, to
understand when and the extent to which such events might rise to the level
of a use of force or armed attack. Focusing on how the laws of war in
particular might operate in cyberspace was, therefore, partly driven by the
reality of external events and partly driven by an interest in viewing those
events through that wartime lens. As additional cyberattacks followed
worldwide, with relevant states finding themselves on both the defensive and
offensive ends of such acts, the need to address a baseline set of rules became
apparent.59
The first Tallinn Manual was born out of this rising awareness about the
need to come to terms with how international law regulates state action in the
cyber realm. That this first project, Tallinn 1.0, focused on cyber warfare,
and not on cyberattacks that do not meet a use-of-force threshold or on cyber
security more broadly, can be traced to this initial trigger for the project. It
can be traced to the needs of the Estonian government in particular but also

57. Joshua Davis, Hackers Take Down the Most Wired Country in Europe, WIRED (Aug. 21,
2007), https://www.wired.com/2007/08/ff-estonia [https://perma.cc/9UL2-98JZ].
58. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 5, at xxiii (stating, in an introductory note by the
current President of Estonia, that the 2007 cyberattacks against Estonia “sped up the establishment
of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence” and that among the center’s first
activities was to commission the study that became Tallinn 1.0); TALLINN MANUAL 1.0, supra note
5, at 1 (stating, in a note by Michael Schmitt, that the original Tallinn Manual project gathered
international law practitioners and scholars in order to “examine how extant legal norms applied to
this ‘new’ form of warfare”).
59. See TALLINN MANUAL 1.0, supra note 5, at 1–2 (discussing the increase in cyber warfare
after the 2007 cyberattack on Estonia, specifically citing the 2008 cyberattacks against Georgia and
the 2010 “Stuxnet” cyberattack against Iran).

2017]

Interpretation Catalysts in Cyberspace

1549

to NATO allies’ interests in contemplating their own engagement in those
events and to the military nature of the organization that ultimately funded,
hosted, and facilitated the process, NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defence
Centre of Excellence (CCD COE). The first Tallinn process thus collected
law-of-war expertise, under the auspices of the CCD COE, in order to seek
to define the actual state of the laws of war in cyberspace as they existed at
that time.60
Following the successful conclusion of the Tallinn 1.0 process, the
project immediately turned toward tackling the broader array of law
applicable to peacetime cyber activities. The leaders of the Tallinn process
recognized that the specific expertise necessary for the first Tallinn project
on cyber warfare would not be sufficient for the broader scope of Tallinn 2.0.
Thus, they expanded the team and, while retaining the same leadership,
brought in an almost entirely new group of legal experts with backgrounds
involving not just the law of armed conflict, but also diplomatic law, the law
of the sea, space law, and, as we have discussed, human rights. Moreover,
the Manual notes that care was taken to send individual chapters out to
“experts in the respective subjects” to “prepare[] initial drafts of the rules and
commentary,” as well as to seek peer review by experts at later points on
drafts of the Manual.61
Yet in broadening the group of experts and expertise—and this is of
course only conjecture—the process may have encountered increased friction
the second time around in coming to consensus on even what applicable body
of law to apply to a particular context, let alone the precise contours of the
legal rule. While surely a group of experts in any single field will have areas
of disagreement, there are also likely to be significant areas of consensus
among actors within a shared field, and more so than there might be if views
were instead solicited from a broader array of experts from multiple fields.
Thus one can readily imagine that a group of, say, LOAC experts may find
more avenues for agreement with respect to how LOAC might apply to a
novel context, than would a more diverse group of experts drawn from
disparate fields of expertise in seeking consensus on the applicability of rules
from any given field. If my instincts are correct, Tallinn 2.0 was as a whole
bound to result in broader brushstroke, less granular rules than Tallinn 1.0,
based on the simple reality of having to seek agreement and enshrine rules
on the basis of the lowest common denominator, in a group of more diverse
expertise.

60. Id. at 1; Manual 2.0 to Be Completed in 2016, NATO COOP. CYBER DEF. CTR. EXCELLENCE
(Oct. 9, 2015), https://ccdcoe.org/tallinn-manual-20-be-completed-2016.html [https://perma.cc/
D4TN-DZXU].
61. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 5, at 6.
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If Tallinn 2.0 were the whole of the project, a more high-level set of
principles than those arising from Tallinn 1.0 might have been the result of
the process across the board. Yet the second Manual could not escape its
ancestry. Tallinn 2.0 could not but inherit the granular in-the-weeds
assessment of LOAC rules as they apply in cyberspace, crafted in the Tallinn
1.0 process. In updating the Manual with a broader group of experts, Tallinn
2.0 may have updated the LOAC rules, but they and states had been living
with the first manual in existence at this point for four years, and the second
group of experts would not have seen themselves as having a mandate or need
to water them down for the purpose of leveling the playing field with other
fields of law in Tallinn 2.0. The result—quite possibly the inevitable result—
is a manual that includes highly granular rules of LOAC, drawn from the first
process, alongside more high-level principles applicable in other areas of law.
Were the Manual to be read in a vacuum, without an understanding of
its history, one would be forgiven for assuming that these other bodies of law
are simply less fleshed out, less determinate, in their application to
cyberspace. And many of them likely are. Nevertheless, had the process
begun with a different focus, not LOAC but a different field of law, it is likely
that a homogenous group of experts (and by homogenous I mean in expertise,
not in beliefs), in any of the fields addressed in the Manual, would be better
able to reach consensus on the application of their field of expertise to
cyberspace than would a body drawn from diverse areas of expertise. And
the process itself would have impelled states to consider and develop the
application of law in that field, just as the Tallinn Manual 1.0 authors
intended in the LOAC space.
Consider a thought experiment. Imagine that the trigger—the
“interpretation catalyst”—prompting experts from Europe and the United
States and elsewhere to come together to determine the applicable rules
governing cyberspace were not the attacks on Estonia, but instead an event
resulting in public and governmental outcry against state surveillance of
personal communications. What if the public revelations of Angela Merkel’s
tapped phone,62 for example, had instead been the catalyst for this process?
At the time of those revelations, states grappled with their response, weighing
condemnation of the United States, while simultaneously facing new
spotlight on their own surveillance measures.63 Just as with the use-of-force

62. Mark Mazzetti & David E. Sanger, Tap on Merkel Provides Peek at Vast Spy Net, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 30, 2013), https://nyti.ms/2lqLFPJ [https://perma.cc/N2N8-UEHZ].
63. See, e.g., Michael Crowley, Spies Like Us: Friends Always Spy on Friends, TIME (Oct. 31,
2013), http://swampland.time.com/2013/10/31/friends-always-spy-on-friends/ [https://perma.cc/
YV34-V4JK] (discussing the prevalence of international spying on allies); Ashley Deeks, The
Increasing State Practice and Opinio Juris on Spying, LAWFARE (May 6, 2015),
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and law-of-war questions that puzzled states in the aftermath of the Estonia
attacks, surveillance too has raised thorny questions regarding the balancing
of states’ positions on both the offensive and defensive end of such measures.
Had those events instead been the catalyst for this soft law process, we
quite likely would have seen a very different group of experts gather to
discuss international cyber law, focused primarily on a very different set of
core issues.64 This “Berlin Manual 1.0,” as we might have called it, might
have focused solely on that initial range of surveillance issues and not
attempted to go beyond, just as Tallinn 1.0 cabined itself to cyber warfare.
An entirely different array of experts would have been convened to tackle
such issues. They would have taken a methodological approach appropriate
to their expertise and to the substantive matter before them. A group of
human rights experts, for example, might have started from a perspective of
applying treaty rules to cyberspace, rather than starting with customary
international law, and might have given more weight to the views of courts,
U.N. bodies, and a plethora of other nongovernmental and inter- or quasigovernmental actors.65 There would have been no shortage of debate about
how the rules applied, as surely there was among the law-of-war experts, but
a multi-year process would have ultimately yielded some granular set of rules
specific to that body of law, and simultaneously pushed the development of
the law toward greater specificity as well.

https://www.lawfareblog.com/increasing-state-practice-and-opinio-juris-spying [https://perma.cc/
BKV2-FGM8] (recalling Germany’s reaction to the Snowden revelations in light of the discovery
of German surveillance); Melissa Eddy, Germany Drops Inquiry Into Claims U.S. Tapped Angela
Merkel’s Phone, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2015), https://nyti.ms/2lebJLy [https://perma.cc/HU3X8H2X] (describing the German investigation into the allegations and the ultimate withdrawal of the
investigation).
64. In the course of the last four years, numerous other processes have in fact been convened
worldwide to examine and attempt to define the rules governing cyber activities in a broad range of
areas, and these are in various stages of implementation. These include the following: African
Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection, June 27, 2014, AU Doc.
EX.CL/846(XXV),
https://ccdcoe.org/sites/default/files/documents/AU-270614-CSConvention
.pdf [https://perma.cc/2DLR-8GQC]; U.N. General Assembly, Letter dated Jan. 9, 2015 from the
Permanent Representatives of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan,
and Uzbekistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/69/723
(Jan. 13, 2015) (introducing the Draft International Code of Conduct for Information Security,
authored under the auspices of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization); Organization of American
States Res. AG/RES. 2004 (XXXIV-O/04), Appendix A (June 8, 2004), http://www.oas
.org/xxxivga/english/docs/approved_documents/adoption_strategy_combat_threats_cybersecurity.
htm [https://perma.cc/6CSR-3UCQ]; High Representative of the Eur. Union for Foreign Affairs &
Security Policy, Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, JOIN (July 2, 2013),
http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/policies/eu-cyber-security/cybsec_comm_en.pdf [https://perma
.cc/9ACF-Q9UT].
65. See PoKempner, supra note 22, at 1604 (discussing the myriad state, nonstate, and
intergovernmental bodies and mechanisms involved in the interpretation and protection of human
rights obligations).
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If the “Berlin Manual” were a success, as was Tallinn 1.0, we can
imagine there would have been clamor for a new manual to cover a broader
range of issues. The second process, if it were run like Tallinn 2.0, would
likely take on new members with expertise in particular fields, like LOAC or
diplomatic facilities, to take a first cut at their respective chapters. It would
likely retain the methodology of the first process, as well as the original set
of rules. And then the group as a whole—including that original group of
human rights experts—would vote on the new provisions, edit them,
determine how best to fit them into the rest of the manual, and perhaps add
caveats so that the new chapters in Berlin 2.0 would not undermine the first
set of rules they had laid out in Berlin 1.0. I think there is no question that
such a process—even assuming the second manual were intended to cover
precisely the same body of material as Tallinn 2.0, and even were the second
group of experts comprising our alternate-universe Berlin 2.0 to be precisely
the same people as those who were actually in the room during Tallinn 2.0—
would yield a very different result.
B.

Interpretation Catalysts at Stage Two
The second level at which the interpretation catalyst operates here is the
Tallinn process itself as an impetus for states to develop cyber law in one
particular field. One consistent refrain—in the Tallinn Manual itself and
from the experts speaking on its behalf—is that the Manual is intended to
represent the lex lata as it stood when the project was drafted and that the
drafters did not see it as part of their mandate to push the law in a particular
direction.66 Yet the directors of the project have repeatedly stated their intent
to impel states forward in clarifying the law in this space.67 Moreover, for
the reasons I laid out at the start of this section, and in more detail in
Interpretation Catalysts,68 the simple existence of such a project, the path of
its development, and the reality of its success in drawing the attention of
states,69 has already and will continue to act as a trigger influencing states in
their own internal and group decision-making processes. That influence
affects state decision making even at an incubatory stage, in the simple act of
deciding whether to send an envoy to engage the Tallinn process, which

66. See, e.g., TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 5, at 3 (“Tallinn Manual 2.0 is intended as an
objective restatement of the lex lata. Therefore, the Experts involved in both projects assiduously
avoided including statements reflecting lex ferenda.”); see also Schmitt, supra note 3; Schmitt &
Vihul, supra note 34.
67. See, e.g., Schmitt, supra note 13 (describing one of Tallinn 2.0’s goals as “allow[ing] states
to focus their efforts where clarification of the law is needed”).
68. Ingber, supra note 3, at 360.
69. See Schmitt, supra note 13 (discussing “The Hague Process”); Over 50 States Consult
Tallinn Manual 2.0, NATO COOP. CYBER DEF. CTR. OF EXCELLENCE (Feb. 2, 2017),
https://ccdcoe.org/over-50-states-consult-tallinn-manual-20.html [https://perma.cc/3QKS-W3Y7].
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specific official to send, from which agency component inside the
government, and with what kind of expertise, and in the packaging of talking
points the state puts together for that expert to deliver. The original Tallinn
process’s focus on the laws of war is inextricably intertwined with a
concomitant need for states to engage with that process through their own
law-of-war experts and resources. Should states then drive the law forward
in the cyberwarfare realm, the experts leading the Tallinn 1.0 process would
rightfully mark that legal development a success, but we cannot ignore that
this development must occur at the opportunity cost of a focus on other bodies
of law that might subsequently be left less defined in the cyber realm.
C.

Harnessing the Power of Interpretation Catalysts
This case study illustrates not only the power of interpretation catalysts
in driving the direction of law as it develops, but also how such triggers can
be harnessed, even manipulated, as a means of influencing the path that
development takes. As I have noted, the initial Estonia cyber attacks, and the
response to them, need not have been conceived primarily in war terms. In
fact, the Tallinn Manual itself ultimately concluded both that “the law of
armed conflict did not apply to those cyber operations because the situation
did not rise to the level of an armed conflict,” and that “there is no definitive
evidence that the hacktivists involved in the cyber operations against Estonia
in 2007 operated pursuant to instructions from any State, nor did any State
endorse and adopt the conduct.”70 The resulting Tallinn project itself might
thus have focused primarily on nonwartime legal questions, such as the
prohibition on intervention, and indeed, on human rights law. Yet, as I noted
above, there were incentives for state actors seeking to create this process to
conceive of those events in war terms,71 and that conception, in turn, may
have enabled greater interest from state allies and prompted NATO
engagement. In any event, whatever the impetus for that conception, these
attacks, the atmospherics and language of “warfare” that surrounded them,
the concomitant establishment of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence
Centre of Excellence, and its immediate commissioning of the Tallinn study
on cyber warfare, all determined the subsequent path for the development of
the law in this space.

70. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 5, at 376, 382.
71. See id. at xxiii (stating, in an introductory note by the current President of Estonia, that the
2007 cyberattacks against Estonia marked “the first time one could apply the Clausewitzean dictum:
War is the continuation of policy by other means”).
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Conclusion
Doctrinal debates about the appropriate legal rules to apply to novel
contexts at times mask institutional undercurrents that led to the adoption or
interpretation of any particular rule. The initial triggers for the development
of a legal position, and the institutional reality of the decision-making process
that plays out, may have an enormous influence on the path that process takes
and the resulting decision. Yet debates about doctrine do not typically
address these triggers or the institutional process taken as a result.72
In concluding, it is worth considering some of the benefits inherent in a
soft law process initially driven by law-of-war expertise and discipline.
There is inherent in law-of-war-driven processes a focus on practical,
operational rules and on how to employ them. There is a focus on states and
what states will be willing to accept and implement, as well as useful—
and to some degree unique—levels of engagement between scholars and
practitioners working in this realm. The combination of practicality and
engagement gives these experts added legitimacy in seeking to constrain state
actors. And finally, at the broadest level, law-of-war experts are a group of
individuals who have cut their teeth applying laws to space that others tend
to see as lawless. That willingness to regulate what others may view as
ungovernable is particularly important for an endeavor seeking to determine
the rules applicable in cyberspace.
Considerations of institutions, actors, and process are critical when
grappling with the development of law, and they are necessary to our
consideration of the differing substantive bodies of law addressed in the
Tallinn Manual 2.0. As the Manual’s directors have acknowledged, the
discussion of human rights was a significant challenge for this project.73 It
has met with some criticism, and it may very well meet with more,
particularly the more states rely upon it.74 Debate will likely center on the
specifics of the doctrinal rules, how the Manual grapples with those rules,
and the difficulties in deriving clear legal guidance for states in this realm.
But when considering those critiques, and the extent to which the Manual
does or does not sufficiently drill down into any particular body of law, it is
essential to contemplate the origins and path of the development of this

72. For a compelling account of how the evolution of the EU’s human rights engagement turned
on early, “pragmatic” decisions of the founding Member States, see Grainne De Burca, The Road
Not Taken: The EU as a Global Human Rights Actor, 105 AM. J. INT’L L. 649 (2011).
73. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 5, at 4 (acknowledging the Manual’s limitation in
the field of human rights law); Schmitt, supra note 13; Tallinn Manual 2.0 to Be Completed in 2016,
NATO COOP. CYBER DEF. CTR. EXCELLENCE (Oct. 9, 2015), https://ccdcoe.org/tallinn-manual-20be-completed-2016.html [https://perma.cc/VER5-QW7T] (quoting managing editor Liis Vihul as
stating, “During this session, the most difficult material proved to be international human rights law
governing activities in cyberspace.”).
74. See, e.g., supra Part I; PoKempner, supra note 22, at 1599.
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project. The status of cyberlaw as it exists today is, and will continue to be,
inextricably bound up in the initial approach taken to the events that triggered
its development.

